

1/31/2025

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

2025-19/3-2

2193751

To: Boeing Commercial Airplane Company

Info: FAA (AVP-1, AVP-200, AFS-200, AFS-900, AFS-260, AFS-100, AIR-720, AIR-780, AIR-360, SEA-AEG), A4A, ALPA, AMFA, ASAP, ATSG, CAPA, IAM, IBT, ICAO, ICASS, IFALPA, IPA, NTSB, PAMA, RAA, SWAPA, TWU

From: Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: B737 Cabin Door Issues

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov.



Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189



ACN 2193751**DATE / TIME**

Date of Occurrence	202412
Local Time Of Day	1801 to 2400

PLACE

Locale	ZZZ.Airport
State	US
Altitude - AGL	0

AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X

ATC / Advisory - Tower	ZZZ
Make Model Name	B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part	121

COMPONENT 1

Aircraft Component	Door
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PERSON 1

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193751

PERSON 2

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193747

PERSON 3

Function - Flight Crew	First Officer
Function - Flight Crew	Pilot Not Flying
ASRS Report Number	2193438

PERSON 4

Function - Flight Crew	Captain
Function - Flight Crew	Pilot Flying
ASRS Report Number	2193428

PERSON 5

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193756

PERSON 6

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193749

PERSON 7

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193759

PERSON 8

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193743

PERSON 9

Function - Flight Attendant	Flight Attendant On Duty
ASRS Report Number	2193744

PERSON 10

Function - Flight Attendant
ASRS Report Number

Flight Attendant On Duty
2193757

EVENTS

Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem - Critical
Anomaly	Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event - Other / Unknown
Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - FAR
Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Maintenance
Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published
	Material / Policy
Detector - Person	Flight Crew
Result - General	Maintenance Action
Result - Flight Crew	Returned To Gate

NARRATIVE 1

Final leg of our trip ZZZ-ZZZ1 Flight XXXX on the 737 aircraft. We closed the door on time, all procedures for arming and cross-checking the doors were done, all flight attendants (FAs) witnessed each other pushing down on the 737 door handle. All call was completed.

We taxied to the runway, and we began to take off at 80 kts., the plane slammed on the breaks and aborted take off. No information was relayed to the passengers or crew. Approximately 10 minutes passed before FAs received a call from the Captain confirming an aborted takeoff, and informed Flight Attendant A that her door handle had flown up during take off. Captain suggested Flight Attendant A double check her door handle. Flight Attendant A pushed door handle down about an inch and heard the handle/door re-secure in place. Flight Attendant A reiterated to Captain that the door handle was pushed down and armed correctly at the gate, and Flight Attendant C witnessed. Captain then advised that Flight Attendant A hold on to the door handle during the second take-off attempt to make sure it didn't fly up/disengage again.

Captain then gave a PA explaining that the issue "fixed itself" and that we would take off again shortly. After the Captain announced "prepare for takeoff," a passenger from the exit row rushed to the back and expressed he did not feel safe to continue to fly. Captain heard the conversation between Flight Attendant A and Flight Attendant B on the interphone and requested FAs convince the passenger to continue on. Passenger declined and we returned to the gate. Flight Attendant C entered flight deck and spoke with the Captain for several minutes requesting maintenance to check the aircraft due to the aborted landing. She explained she did not feel safe to continue and that there was a serious door handle issue. Captain continued to insist the aircraft was safe, but Flight Attendant C was not satisfied with this answer. As a result, the crew expressed a need to follow safety protocol and have the faulty door checked by Maintenance. After Maintenance checked the aircraft, the aircraft was taken out of service.

The crew continued to express that we were not refusing to fly/work the flight, as it was important for us to get home. However, due to the Captain's original decision to avoid Maintenance and attempt a second takeoff, as well as his request to Flight Attendant A to hold on to the door handle during takeoff, the crew did not feel safe flying with him. Flight Attendant A called and requested new pilots. Request was denied and FAs were removed from the flight.

Suggestions: We are suggesting pilots to follow safety protocol and support FA safety concerns.

NARRATIVE 2

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

NARRATIVE 3

During Takeoff Roll after 80 kts. we received a caution for Doors. I announced to the Captain that it was the Forward Entry door and he elected to reject the takeoff. We taxied clear, communicated with our crew, cabin and operations, ran brake cooling charts and then taxied back to re-attempt the takeoff. While in sequence for takeoff the flight attendants (FAs) informed us that there was a passenger that they were unable to convince to continue the flight so we returned to the gate to deplane the passenger.

Cause: Despite the standard briefing on reject criteria, the Captain elected to perform a rejected takeoff. Maybe a result of poor focus following a deadhead, full meal, late night and startle factor with an event not often encountered. No major errors or damage.

NARRATIVE 4

On takeoff roll around 90 it's door warning light came on. I elected to abort the takeoff. Checked with Flight Attendant A to make sure the FWD ENTRY door handle was fully down. Check the brake energy chart and confirmed in the normal range. We were preparing for another attempt to depart when one of the passenger asked to get off the flight. Returned to gate to deplane refuel and have Maintenance personnel check the offending door. At the gate I was informed that the tolerance for the handle was out of limits and the aircraft was removed from service.

Cause: Aircraft malfunctions.

NARRATIVE 5

During takeoff, at 80 kts., the plane slammed on the breaks and aborted take off. No information was relayed to the passengers or crew. Approximately 10-15 minutes passed before flight attendants (FAs) received a call from the Captain confirming an aborted takeoff, and informed Flight Attendant A that her door handle had flown up during take off. Captain suggested Flight Attendant A double check her door handle. Flight Attendant A pushed door handle down about an inch and heard the handle/door re-secure in place. Flight Attendant A reiterated to Captain that the door handle was pushed down and armed correctly at the gate, and Flight Attendant C witnessed. Captain then advised that Flight Attendant A hold on to the door handle during the second take-off attempt to make sure it didn't fly up/disengage again. The Captain returned to the gate due to a passenger wanting to deplane. Flight Attendant B and Flight Attendant C requested Maintenance and the Captain repeatedly said the plane was safe. The crew expressed a need to follow safety protocol and have the faulty door checked by Maintenance. After Maintenance checked the aircraft, it was taken out of service. As a result, all FAs on board no longer felt safe flying with Captain due to his persistence in downplaying that there was any Maintenance issues with the aircraft.

Suggestions: We are suggesting pilots to follow safety protocol, and support flight attendant safety concerns.

NARRATIVE 6

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

NARRATIVE 7

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

NARRATIVE 8

Our crew boarded our final leg of our trip ZZZ-ZZZ1 on the 737 aircraft. We closed the door on time, all procedures for arming and cross-checking the doors were done, all flight attendants (FAs) witnessed each other pushing down on the 737 door handle. All call was completed.

We taxied to the runway, all FAs were seated, and we began to take off. At 80 kts., the plane slammed on the breaks and aborted take off. No information was relayed to the passengers or crew. Approximately 10 minutes passed before FAs received a call from the Captain confirming an aborted takeoff, and informed Flight Attendant A that her door handle had flown up during take off. Captain suggested Flight Attendant A double check her door handle. Flight Attendant A pushed door handle down about an inch and heard the handle/door re-secure in place. Flight Attendant A reiterated to Captain that the door handle was pushed down and armed correctly at the gate, and Flight Attendant C witnessed. Captain then advised that Flight Attendant A hold on to the door handle during the second take-off attempt to make sure it didn't fly up/disengage again.

Captain then gave a PA explaining that the issue "fixed itself" and that we would take off again shortly. After the Captain announced "prepare for takeoff," a passenger in the exit row rushed to the back and expressed he did not feel safe to continue to fly. Captain heard the conversation between Flight Attendant A and Flight Attendant B on the interphone and requested FAs convince the passenger to continue on. Passenger declined and we returned to the gate. Flight Attendant C entered flight deck and spoke with the Captain for several minutes requesting Maintenance to check the aircraft due to the aborted landing. She explained she did not feel safe to continue and that there was a serious door handle issue. Captain continued to insist the aircraft was safe, but Flight Attendant C was not satisfied with this answer. As a result, the crew expressed a need to follow safety protocol and have the faulty door checked by Maintenance. After Maintenance checked the aircraft, the aircraft was taken out of service.

The crew continued to express that we were not refusing to fly/work the flight, as it was important for us to get home. However, due to the Captain's original decision to avoid Maintenance and attempt a second takeoff, as well as his request to Flight Attendant A to hold on to the door handle during takeoff, the crew did not feel safe flying with him. Flight Attendant A called and requested new pilots. Request was denied and FAs were removed from the flight.

Suggestions: We are suggesting pilots to follow safety protocol, and support flight attendant safety concerns.

NARRATIVE 9

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

NARRATIVE 10

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

SYNOPSIS

B737 flight crew reported a main cabin door warning light approaching the high speed regime during takeoff, and rejected the takeoff. The flight attendants indicated the door was correctly closed and armed. The Captain returned the aircraft to the gate for where maintenance removed it from service for the door latch being out of limits.