

2/20/2025

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

2025-30/11-8

To: Airport Manager, Grand Junction Reg'l Airport (GJT), CO, FAA (AAS-1,
ATM GJT Tower)

2200766

Info: FAA (AVP-1, AVP-200, AFS-260, AFS-200, ANM-600, Director of Air Traffic
Operations CSA, Runway Safety Team), A4A, ALPA, AMFA, APA, ASAP, ATSG,
CAPA, IAM, IATA, ICASS, IFALPA, IPA, NTSB, PAMA, SWAPA, TWU

From: Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: GJT Displaced Threshold Awareness

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov.



Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189



ACN 2200766**DATE / TIME**

Date of Occurrence	202501
Local Time Of Day	0601 to 1200

PLACE

Locale	GJT.Airport
State	CO
Altitude - AGL	0

AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X

ATC / Advisory - Tower	GJT
Make Model Name	Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part	91

PERSON 1

Function - Flight Crew	First Officer
Function - Flight Crew	Pilot Not Flying
ASRS Report Number	2200766

PERSON 2

Function - Flight Crew	Captain
Function - Flight Crew	Pilot Flying
ASRS Report Number	2200774

EVENTS

Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published Material / Policy
Detector - Person	Flight Crew
Result - Flight Crew	Became Reoriented

NARRATIVE 1

On Day 0, we were taxiing to Runway 11 via Taxiway A when the Tower instructed us to expedite in order to meet an EDCT. As we neared Taxiway A2, still on A, we were cleared for immediate takeoff. Turning onto Runway 11 put us directly into the sun. Visibility was tough, and we thought we had passed the runway threshold before advancing the thrust levers for takeoff. However, with the sun in our eyes, it was hard to make out any visual cues ahead. It wasn't until I saw the yellow chevrons beneath us, just after we applied takeoff power, that I realized what had happened.

After reviewing with the Captain, we saw that there was no NOTAM about this recent change on the airport. This would've given us insight to the displaced threshold change. There was also nothing placarded nor any signs delineating a power up point at that end of the runway. Both of these being present would have prevented this event from happening.

NARRATIVE 2

After leaving the device pad we were taxiing to Runway 11 via Taxiway A when the tower told us to expedite in order to make an EDCT. As we approached Taxiway A2 while still on Taxiway A the tower cleared us for immediate takeoff. As we turned onto Runway 11 we were looking directly into the sun. Runway 11 has a very odd displaced threshold. We thought we had rolled forward far enough to have passed the runway threshold and advanced the thrust levers to takeoff. It was difficult to see any visual cues looking forward as

the sun was right in our eyes. I noticed the yellow chevrons as we passed over them shortly after applying takeoff power.

The configuration of the displaced threshold is unusual in its appearance. The only reference I could see with the sun right in the windshield was after we rolled over the yellow chevrons at the displaced threshold. I do not recall any signs delineating the takeoff power point that are common at other airports.

If I see another configuration like this in the future I will be much more alert to the possible ambiguity of the markings.

Time compression also played a role as the tower had asked us to expedite our takeoff roll in order to make an EDCT. As is usually the case there were multiple contributing factors.

SYNOPSIS

Flight crew reported inadvertently initiating the takeoff roll at GJT on the displaced threshold, citing lack of NOTAM as contributing.