3/16/2026 **FOR YOUR INFORMATION** 2026-91/10-7

2323872

To: Airport Manager, Marrakesh Menara Airport (GMMX/RAK), Morocco, FAA (DFW-IFO)

Info: FAA (AVP-1, AVP-200, AFS-260, AFS-200), A4A, ALPA, AOPA, APA, ASAP, ATSG, CAPA, ICASS, ICAO, IFALPA, NBAA, NTSB, Moroccan Airports Authority (ONDA)

From: Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: Similar Sounding SID Procedures at GMMX/RAK

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov.

Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189

ACN 2323872	
DATE / TIME	
Date of Occurrence	202601
Local Time Of Day	1201 to 1800
PLACE	
Locale	GMMX.Airport
State	FO
Altitude - MSL	0
ENVIRONMENT	
Flight Conditions	VMC
AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X	
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	121
PERSON 1	
Function - Flight Crew	Captain
Function - Flight Crew	Pilot Flying
ASRS Report Number	2323872
EVENTS	
Anomaly	Deviation - Track / Heading - All Types
Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Clearance
Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published Material / Policy
Anomaly	Ground Event / Encounter - Other / Unknown
Detector - Person	Flight Crew
NARRATIVE 1	

Operations at RAK introduce several systemic, non-standard threats that increase crew workload and elevate risk during ground and departure phases. These threats are primarily procedural and communication-based rather than individual-performance related. The following observations are provided to support hazard identification and potential mitigation.

Threat and error management analysis. Ground operations – pushback / tow procedures. Non-standard pushback practices. Language barriers between flight crew and ground personnel. Lack of standardized communication protocols during tow reconfiguration.

While complying with pushback instructions, ground personnel indicated they do not normally tow beyond [Gate] XX. Though adequate clearance existed behind the aircraft and taxi-out under own power appeared feasible, a safety concern arose when I requested the aircraft be repositioned forward. Without notifying the flight deck, the towbar was disconnected, turned, and reconnected. The crew was not instructed to set the parking brake, nor advised that the tow configuration had changed.

Tow operation conducted without flight deck awareness. Absence of required brake coordination during towbar reconfiguration.

This created a momentary loss of situational awareness and removed an essential safety barrier during a critical ground operation, compounded by language limitations and non-standard local practices.

Suggestions: Standardized tow communication protocols. Mandatory flight deck notification prior to towbar disconnect/reconnect. Brake status confirmation prior to any tow configuration change.

Departure clearance timing. Departure clearance issued prior to completion of the PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST.

At RAK, departure clearance was issued after pushback but prior to taxi. This deviates from SOP flow and introduces task interruption during checklist execution.

Disruption of normal checklist sequence. Increased workload and distraction during a high-risk phase.

This practice increases the likelihood of missed items, degraded task prioritization, and reduced margin during taxi and departure preparation.

Suggestions: Procedural review of clearance delivery timing. Crew guidance emphasizing checklist completion discipline prior to clearance acceptance when feasible.

SID / fix nomenclature confusion. Similar-sounding SIDs and fixes. The expected clearance was MAGAV3D; however, the initial clearance issued was MABAP3D. After departure, ATC issued a right turn direct MAGAV.

Similarity in fix and SID naming increases the potential for clearance misinterpretation, especially in high workload or non-native English environments.

Suggestions: Improved differentiation of fix and SID nomenclature. Enhanced chart depiction or procedural notes to highlight common confusion points.

SYNOPSIS

Air carrier Captain reported similar sounding SID designations was a factor in a track deviation departing GMMX/RAK.