# ALERT BULLETIN

AB 2026:17/8-2
4/13/2026
2328713, 2328098

TO: Airport Manager, West Palm Beach, (PBI), FL, FAA (AAS-1, ATM PBI ATCT)

INFO: FAA (AVP-1, AVP-200, ASO-600, AFS-260, AJV-A, AFS-200, Director of Air Traffic Operations ESA South), A4A, AAAE, ALPA, AOPA, APA, ASAP, ATSG, EAA, ICAO, ICASS, IFALPA, IPA, NAFI, NBAA, NTSB, RAA, SWAPA, Jeppesen Sanderson Inc.

FROM: Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

SUBJ: PBI RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R Approach Procedure Concerns

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the following:

ASRS received a report from a corporate jet flight crew expressing concern over the design of the PBI RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach. Reporter stated the approach is designed with a 30-degree offset to avoid a TFR, resulting in flights holding short of Runway 28R for departure experiencing difficulty in spotting arrivals using that procedure. Reporter also noted that aircraft flying that procedure would have difficulty meeting stabilized approach criteria.

Report 2328098 describes similar PBI RNAV issues. This report is also enclosed.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov.

Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189

| ACN 2328713 | |
|---|---|
| **DATE / TIME** | |
| Date of Occurrence | 202601 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 to 1200 |
| **PLACE** | |
| Locale | PBI.Airport |
| State | FL |
| Altitude - AGL | 0 |
| **ENVIRONMENT** | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| **AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X** | |
| ATC / Advisory - Tower | PBI |
| Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
| Operating Under FAR Part | 91 |
| **AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT Y** | |
| ATC / Advisory - Tower | PBI |
| Make Model Name | Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
| **PERSON 1** | |
| Function - Flight Crew | Captain |
| Function - Flight Crew | Pilot Flying |
| ASRS Report Number | 2328713 |
| **PERSON 2** | |
| Function - Flight Crew | First Officer |
| Function - Flight Crew | Pilot Not Flying |
| ASRS Report Number | 2328674 |
| **EVENTS** | |
| Anomaly | ATC Issue - All Types |
| Anomaly | Conflict - Ground Conflict, Critical |
| Detector - Person | Flight Crew |
| Result - Flight Crew | Took Evasive Action |
| Result - Air Traffic Control | Separated Traffic |

**NARRATIVE 1**

Our aircraft, Aircraft X, was holding short of Runway 28R at Intersection L7 at PBI. The Tower Controller (frequency 119.1) cleared us for takeoff on Runway 28R and advised of another approaching aircraft on a five-mile final to Runway 32. My Co-Captain read back the takeoff clearance and finished final checklist items, and I looked to my three o'clock position to ensure the final approach was clear. I did not see any other aircraft, so I released the brakes. As I turned my head back to the left (forward), I then saw landing lights from about the one o'clock position. I immediately stopped the aircraft and called out the traffic, which my Co-Captain noticed simultaneously and called "STOP STOP STOP."

In the ATC audio obtained, the controller seemed to be attempting to cancel our takeoff clearance in this moment, but the message was garbled. Shortly after, the pilot of the jet on short final exclaimed that he was

cleared to land but was going around. The controller did acknowledge the situation was a mistake on his end. We held position just past the hold short line but not yet on the runway, and awaited further instructions.

Our takeoff clearance was canceled, and we were told to line up and wait on 28R, which we did. We were cleared for takeoff shortly thereafter, and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

After discussion, my Co-Captain and I agreed that the RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach that was in use that day was a major contributing factor. In addition, I posit that the design of the cockpit and possible expectation bias were also contributory.

The RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach at PBI is offset 30 degrees from the final approach course to avoid overflight of the TFR over Mar-a-Lago. This places approaching aircraft in an area of the sky that controllers and pilots may not be used to looking at when clearing final approach prior to takeoff; and in our case, the aircraft windscreen structure temporarily obscured the jet from view.

Additionally, due to the geometry of the approach, the fix that we are expected to fly by to align with the runway (FREBY) is 0.9 nautical miles from the runway threshold. Maneuvering this close in to the runway and low to the ground (approximately 356 feet above the TDZE if my math is correct, based off the 3.1 degree descent angle prescribed by the approach plate is dangerous, and does not meet the stable approach criteria recommended by the organization, AC 120-108A, AC 91-79B, and the “Stabilized Approach and Landing” fact sheet produced by the FAASTeam of being stabilized by 500 feet AGL when in VMC.

As far as human factors, I think expectation bias played a part here. As a pilot, I am used to not having another airplane on short final when cleared for takeoff at a towered airport; and, while helpful and prudent, being alerted to the airplane approaching Runway 32 may have also influenced my bias when scanning the sky before crossing the hold short line because, surely, the controller would have also mentioned the airplane on short final to our runway, right? As a controller, one may get into a rhythm and temporarily let their guard down, especially if SOPs have changed recently. Having a “trust but verify” mentality and making a conscious effort to recognize when one is feeling too comfortable may have prevented any of us having been put in this situation.

## NARRATIVE 2

While holding short of 28R on Taxiway L7, we advised Palm Beach Tower that we were ready for departure. Within 30 seconds we were given a takeoff clearance and advised that there was landing traffic for Runway 32 that was on a 5-mile final. As pilot not flying, I read back the takeoff clearance and acknowledged the traffic on the 5-mile final for 32. Our aircraft started moving to take Runway 28R and crossed the hold short line as both pilots looked to visually clear the final. I noticed Aircraft Y on short final (estimated 1 mile) and told the pilot flying to stop the aircraft as the pilot flying also noticed traffic on final. This was all happening as the Tower Controller was fumbling with our tail number over the radio but once he got it out he told us to hold our position. We stopped [our] aircraft before it reached the runway. The aircraft on final stated over the radio that they were cleared to land on 28R but were going around. He also asked “What was the deal with that?”, to which the Tower Controller stated that he had made an error. We held our position until we were given instructions to line up and wait on 28R. The aircraft we were originally warned about landed on Runway 32

and the aircraft that went around on 28R was handed off to Approach Control. We were then issued a takeoff clearance on Runway 28R and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

I believe the Tower Controller issuing a takeoff clearance with airplanes landing on intersecting runways led to this runway incursion. The offset RNAV approaches for Runway 28R also make it difficult to plainly and efficiently see aircraft on final.

## SYNOPSIS

Corporate flight crew expressed concern about the design of the PBI RNAV (GPS) X Runway 28R approach, alleging the offset makes it difficult for departing aircraft flight crews to spot inbound aircraft.

| ACN 2328098 | |
|---|---|
| **DATE / TIME** | |
| Date of Occurrence | 202601 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801 to 2400 |
| **PLACE** | |
| Locale | PBI.Airport |
| State | FL |
| **AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X** | |
| Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
| Operating Under FAR Part | 121 |
| **PERSON 1** | |
| Function - Flight Crew | Pilot Flying |
| ASRS Report Number | 2328098 |
| **EVENTS** | |
| Anomaly | Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published Material / Policy |
| Anomaly | No Specific Anomaly Occurred - Unwanted Situation |
| Detector - Person | Flight Crew |
| **NARRATIVE 1** | |

The FAA implemented new arrival and departure procedures to avoid a recently erected, permanent TFR over Mar A Lago. The airspace is restricted for a one-mile radius around Mar A Lago 24/7 whether the President is in residence or not. In reaction to this restriction, departures to the east and arrivals to the west are now required to maneuver to avoid the TFR. The departures to the east are expected to make an immediate turn to a 70-degree heading and are typically vectored back onto one of the SIDs to rejoin the flight plan route. Other than the threat of not managing the FMC and Mode Control Panel (on Aircraft X), the departures are not that unusual.

The arrivals to the west are an entirely different matter. Two new RNAV approaches have been implemented to Runway 28R. Both follow an initial offset course of 249 from the initial approach fix to the runway. The X approach then adopts a visual flight path from 1 1/2 miles from the runway to the threshold and required rather aggressive maneuvering at low level to make a final turn to align with the runway. It is an extremely uncomfortable series of maneuvers and questionable from a stabilized approach perspective. The approach is not approved during IFR operations. And if the ceiling and/or visibility is anywhere close to the minimums, it would certainly not allow for a safe operation. The Y approach has a Radius-to-Fix (RF) leg to follow to the runway from the Final Approach Point (FAP) and are authorized for IFR approach operations, but still requires aggressive maneuvering at low levels to align with the runway. These concerns are magnified at night. Unlike DCA or LGA charted visual approaches, the runway end at PBI is embedded in a sea of other lights and very difficult to differentiate in the dark. Furthermore, the REIL for the south runway are operationally always blinking on high, which makes the landing runway very difficult to ascertain in a low level turn into a sea of lights. This is particularly problematic for pilots who aren't familiar with the PBI runway configuration, and could easily lead to airplane mistaking the much shorter runway for the north runway and either becoming unstable or in the worst case, landing on a completely unusable runway, in our operation.

So I believe we need a critical analysis of the PBI operation during west operations. And press the case that the straight in RNAV and ILS approaches are being neglected in favor of a potentially dangerous approach when the airport is landing west.

As an aside, I have had discussions about the situation with PBI ARTCC and they too are concerned. So maybe a liaison with the PBI TRACON can provide a united front on this issue.

## SYNOPSIS

Air carrier pilot reported the new procedures due to the permanent TFR over Mar-a-Lago have resulted in aggressive maneuvering at low levels being required for RNAV approaches to PBI.