

9/11/2026

**FOR YOUR INFORMATION**

2026-319/7-16

2394569

To: FAA (ATM NCT TRACON)


Info: FAA (AVP-1, AVP-200, AFS-260, AFS-200, Director of Air Traffic Operations WSA),  
A4A, ALPA, AMFA, APA, ASAP, ATSG, CAPA, IAM, IATA, ICASS, IFALPA, NTSB,  
PAMA, TWU

From: Becky L. Hooey, Director  
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: NCT TRACON Operations

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at [becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov](mailto:becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov).



Aviation Safety Reporting System  
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189



**ACN 2394569****DATE / TIME**

|                    |              |
|--------------------|--------------|
| Date of Occurrence | 202608       |
| Local Time Of Day  | 1801 to 2400 |

**AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X**

|                         |                                               |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| ATC / Advisory - TRACON | NCT                                           |
| Make Model Name         | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |

**PERSON 1**

|                                |          |
|--------------------------------|----------|
| Function - Air Traffic Control | Approach |
| ASRS Report Number             | 2394569  |

**EVENTS**

|                   |                                                                       |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Anomaly           | ATC Issue - All Types                                                 |
| Anomaly           | Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published<br>Material / Policy |
| Detector - Person | Air Traffic Control                                                   |

**NARRATIVE 1**

I was training conducting OJT on the Seca position. While we were already on position, we were informed of an Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) 110 – 130 that ran from north of SFO, through SNS, over MRY, and south. We were forced to read the briefing on position because nobody had offered it, I just observed it on the Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) Controller Equipment Information Display System (ACE-IDS). There was no time to review procedures of a non-standard operation, so we also were forced to read the 7110.65 on position to ensure we handled the ALTRV correctly. I subsequently alerted the supervisor that I did not believe the facility was in compliance with the .65 and the ALTRV as I saw numerous aircraft descending and climbing through it while it was active. We were told by both supervisors on the floor that we only needed to separate from the targets when we observed them in the ALTRV. Myself and others raised concern that there was no guarantee these aircraft were on flight following as they were completely out of BRAVO and not required to call us. In addition, you cannot separate from non-radar identified aircraft. There was no guarantee we would even pick these aircraft up on radar. This concern was dismissed completely. My trainee and myself missed this ALTRV airspace entirely as required by the 7110.65, but I cannot say the same for the building as a whole. I strongly believe this was an incredibly unsafe situation that could have easily resulted in a mid-air.

There was a clear breakdown in supervision on this shift and in the building as a whole. There has been constant pressure on supervisors to provide operational oversight and increase time on position, especially at NCT. The supervisors appeared to be much more concerned with splitting needless sectors (non-standard Fremont and Seca split during excessively light traffic) and flight data than actually providing oversight. There were numerous concerns raised that appeared to go unheard/disregarded, and we were not briefed on the operation at all prior to taking the sector. Standalone supervision is failing, causing more distractions and resulting in less engagement by the Operations Supervisor (OS) crew. In addition, the relieving controller for us had not received a briefing and we were forced to tell them to go FIND the OS who had the floor to get briefed because they weren't actually in the area.

It was extremely clear that the supervisors did not understand what was going on during this ALTRV. Standards were made up and we were directed to disregard a NOTAMed procedure. Other areas transiting

through the ALTRV was clearly a breakdown in supervision and knowledge of the rules. There should be mandatory briefings for the OSs, Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and OM's on ALTRV procedures based on facts and the 7110.65. The controller workforce was completely let down.

## **SYNOPSIS**

NCT TRACON Controller reported supervisors did not understand what was going on during an ALTRV and also stated the facility may not have been in compliance.