

8/25/2026

**FOR YOUR INFORMATION**

2026-301/8-26

2386123

To: FAA (ATM ZDC ARTCC)


Info: FAA (AVP-1, AVP-200, AFS-260, AFS-200, Director of Air Traffic Operations ESA North), A4A, ALPA, AMFA, APA, ASAP, ATSG, CAPA, IAM, IATA, ICASS, IFALPA, NTSB, PAMA, SWAPA, TWU

From: Becky L. Hooey, Director  
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: ZDC TMU Procedures

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at [becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov](mailto:becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov).



Aviation Safety Reporting System  
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189



**ACN 2386123****DATE / TIME**

|                    |              |
|--------------------|--------------|
| Date of Occurrence | 202607       |
| Local Time Of Day  | 1801 to 2400 |

**PLACE**

|        |           |
|--------|-----------|
| Locale | ZDC.ARTCC |
| State  | VA        |

**AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X**

|                         |                                               |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| ATC / Advisory - Center | ZDV                                           |
| Make Model Name         | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |

**PERSON 1**

|                                |         |
|--------------------------------|---------|
| Function - Air Traffic Control | Enroute |
| ASRS Report Number             | 2386123 |

**EVENTS**

|                   |                                                                    |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Anomaly           | ATC Issue - All Types                                              |
| Anomaly           | Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published Material / Policy |
| Anomaly           | Inflight Event / Encounter - Weather / Turbulence                  |
| Detector - Person | Air Traffic Control                                                |
| Result - General  | None Reported / Taken                                              |

**NARRATIVE 1**

Weather had shut down just about all of the traffic through along the east coast and up into the northeast. ZNY had told us, at the sectors repeatedly, they were not taking any traffic due to the weather. There were already a bunch of Traffic Management Initiatives (TMIs) out, including SWANN stops from PCT and stops over RBV. Area 2 asked about an aircraft they had stuck to the south and if ZNY would be able to take them. It was coordinated, at the sector, for JFK to take the one international and nothing else. About 5 – 10 minutes later, SWANN started to see international departures depart off of IAD routed over RBV. I called the Traffic Management Center (TMC) and asked why these aircraft are departing and she said Person A had released the international departures. This was done without consulting the area and sounds like it was done without coordinating with ZNY as well.

Traffic Management Unit (TMU) seems to think they know better than the areas do and it is has been putting the sectors in positions where they are stuck with traffic and nowhere to put them because TMU has ZERO idea what they are doing. Departing traffic into known extreme precipitation without coordinating that with the areas is dangerous. Even TMU acting on their own even when the area has told them something else, is dangerous. It continues to erode trust between the workforce and TMU through the heart of Severe Weather Avoidance Plan (SWAP).

TMU needs to listen to the areas' needs rather than their command center overlords. Area 1 should act on what we need first and then advise TMU on what has been done. If TMU isn't going to listen anyway, they will be the last to know.

**SYNOPSIS**

ZDC Center Controller reported TMU procedure concerns.