9/22/2026 **FOR YOUR INFORMATION** 2026-335/5-98

2397408

To: Airport Manager, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), VA, FAA (AEA-600), Jeppesen Sanderson Inc.

Info: FAA (Director of Air Traffic Operations ESA North, ATM IAD Tower, AAS-300, AVP-1, AVP-200, AAS-1, AFS-260, AFS-200, AJV-A, Runway Safety Team), A4A, AAAE, ALPA, AOPA, APA, ASAP, ATSAP, ATSG, CAPA, IATA, ICASS, IFALPA, NATCA, NBAA, NTSB, RAA, SWAPA

From: Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: IAD Taxiway Confusion

We recently received ASRS reports describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.

To properly assess the usefulness of our alert message service, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your feedback on the value of the information that we have provided. Please contact Dr. Becky Hooey at (408) 541-2854 or email at becky.l.hooey@nasa.gov.

Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189

ACN 2397408	
DATE / TIME	
Date of Occurrence	202608
Local Time Of Day	1801 to 2400
PLACE	
Locale	IAD.Airport
State	DC
Altitude - AGL	0
ENVIRONMENT	
Flight Conditions	VMC
Weather	Rain
Weather	Thunderstorm
AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT X	
ATC / Advisory - Tower	IAD
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	121
PERSON 1	
Function - Flight Crew	First Officer
Function - Flight Crew	Pilot Not Flying
ASRS Report Number	2397408
EVENTS	
Anomaly	Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural - Published Material / Policy
Anomaly	Ground Incursion - Taxiway
Anomaly	Ground Event / Encounter - Other / Unknown
Detector - Person	Flight Crew
Result - Flight Crew	Became Reoriented
NARRATIVE 1	

The following narrative describes an event that took place on an overnight flight from IAD to ZZZZ. On this particular flight, the Captain (CA) was the pilot flying (PF) and I, the First Officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring (PM). We also had an additional First Officer onboard serving as a Relief Pilot. Preflight planning and gate preparations were normal and routine, and all flight deck duties were completed with ample time. During the pre-departure briefing, in addition to covering all applicable items on the briefing card, we specifically discussed the NOTAMs concerning construction at IAD, including the work on Taxiway Yankee between Y8 and Y11. The NOTAMs also outlined a maximum taxi speed of 9 knots in the vicinity of the construction, which was included in the environmental threats portion of our briefing.

Following completion of the briefing, the flight was delayed due to thunderstorms passing over IAD. The storms produced heavy downpours, lightning, and thunder, and resulted in the ramp opening and closing multiple times for the safety of the ramp personnel. We included a discussion of the wet conditions as part of our pre-departure briefing (to include the selection of wet runway when calculating our takeoff performance). Once the weather passed, boarding and loading of bags and cargo were completed. With the aircraft ready for departure, the preflight and before-push checklists complete, and the ramp crew ready to commence push, we coordinated with Ramp Control and began the pushback.

After engine start, we were instructed to taxi west from Gate XX to Spot XX and contact Ground. During this time, I informed the CA that we had not yet received our final weights. With the CA's concurrence, I was able to allocate heads-down time to send a miscellaneous message requesting an update on the final weights. We subsequently received a message indicating that Load Planning was working to resolve a weight issue. After contacting Ground, we were cleared to taxi to Runway 30 via Zulu and Y11. We informed Ground that we were still awaiting final numbers so that we could proactively coordinate an area to park and wait rather than contribute to congestion on the taxiway. Ground instructed us to pull into the Runway 30 run-up block and advise when ready to continue. Upon reaching the Runway 30 run-up block, we parked alongside two other aircraft, which were positioned to our left as we faced west. While in the run-up block, we received the final weights, requested updated runway data (wet, due to surface conditions) due to a significant weight change, and once received, verified the new data and all associated FMC/MCP (Mode Control Panel) inputs. We then completed the Before Takeoff Checklist to the line. After completing these items, we informed Ground Control that we were ready to taxi for departure.

Ground provided a clearance to follow Aircraft Y and taxi to Runway 30 via Zulu and Y11. Due to the company aircraft positioned to our left, the CA initially taxied forward, perpendicular to Taxiway Zulu, before making the required 90-degree left turn to join Zulu. During this turn, the "Final Items" checklist call was made and I announced that I was going heads down to complete the flow and checklist.

Unknown to us at the time, due to construction on the parallel Taxiway Yankee, the taxiway centerline on Zulu had been temporarily shifted further east via a dogleg to provide additional clearance from the construction area. This configuration differed from the taxiway geometry I had experienced on previous flights departing Runway 30 in the preceding weeks, even though construction was ongoing in the same general area. Because of the angle at which we joined Zulu, the altered taxiway geometry was encountered almost immediately following the turn and was not readily apparent from our approach. The nighttime conditions and wet, reflective pavement further reduced the visual conspicuity of the temporary taxiway alignment. Additionally, the taxiway edge lighting and flashing red construction lights remained positioned along the former Zulu taxiway alignment, providing visual cues that continued to reinforce the original taxiway geometry.

As we completed the turn, I recognized that the new taxiway centerline was positioned significantly to our left and immediately brought this to the CA's attention. The CA made the appropriate correction to reposition the aircraft onto the temporary centerline. The aircraft remained well clear of the lit construction obstacles throughout the event. Our position remained along the former Zulu taxiway centerline, with the construction area and associated lighting/cones offset from our path. The deviation was promptly recognized and corrected without further consequence.

The remainder of the checklist was completed and the departure was otherwise uneventful. Once airborne, I reviewed the applicable NOTAMs, the airport AMM (Airport Moving Map) and taxiway reference pages on FD Pro, the digital ATIS at IAD, and available company bulletins. I did not identify any information describing the temporary taxiway geometry change or the displacement of the Zulu taxiway centerline that would have allowed us to anticipate and specifically brief the altered alignment prior to departure.

The repositioning from the Runway 30 run-up block, the angle at which we joined Taxiway Zulu, and the nighttime conditions combined with the wet, reflective pavement further reduced the visual cues available to recognize the temporary alignment. Although the construction itself had been identified and discussed during the pre-departure briefing, the specific change to the taxiway geometry was not apparent from the information available to us or from our approach to join Taxiway Zulu. These factors collectively contributed to the difficulty in recognizing the temporary displacement as the aircraft initially followed the former taxiway centerline.

Following the event, the crew debriefed the taxiway confusion and discussed the factors that contributed to the difficulty in recognizing the temporary alignment. We agreed that submitting a report would be both appropriate and valuable in documenting the event and identifying the operational threat. We felt that sharing these observations through the safety reporting process could contribute to our SMS and help increase awareness of the challenges associated with temporary taxiway configurations, particularly when changes in geometry are combined with nighttime operations and reduced visual cues.

SYNOPSIS

Air carrier First Officer reported the flight crew deviated from the taxiway centerline at IAD's Taxiway Zulu due to confusion with the temporary taxiway geometry change. Information regarding this temporary change was not found in any of the resources that were available to the flight crew.